ISSA 6302 The Transformational Imperative:  
Reorganizing in a Multi-polar World

Course Description/ Purpose

Course Description  
This course examines American intelligence and national security policies and planning from World War II to the present. Students examine how ideas and interests shape and transform national security decision making from the White House to the warfighter, and how the complexities of a multi-polar world have affected the traditional policy formulation process. The course will address theory, practice, and processes as they relate to the most important national security topics of the day. Students will debate and explore how ideas and interest work together or in opposition to shape national security policies and priorities. Students will learn how the "war of ideas" has evolved from the Cold War to the global war on terrorism; the influence of the media, social media, and think tanks on intelligence; and how the definition of intelligence and national security has changed.

The course runs 8 weeks, with one lesson a week. This is compressed version of a semester course, and it is a graduate course. Expect considerable reading and writing every week. This material is extremely relevant and important, as the entire business of intelligence must learn to operate in a new paradigm since the end of the Cold War, and, more importantly, the experience of 9/11.

Purpose of Course  
The study of intelligence and national security operations is an analysis of how the various branches of government work together, and as a check upon each other, how they work to protect and promote American interests at home and abroad. The purpose of this course is to provide you with an overview of national security policy analysis and the United States intelligence community and specifically how they are interacting--or should be doing so--in a very complex and rapidly changing threat environment that runs the gamut from nuclear-armed state adversaries, to international criminal organizations, to the effects of climate change and the ensuing imperatives for American assistance in area hard-hit by this phenomenon. As you progress through this course, you will learn about strategic thought and strategy formulation,
As a result of completing this course, the student will be able to:

1. Demonstrate a working knowledge of the various definitions of national security interests that have been applied during various periods of US history.
2. Identify key agencies within the US and UK Intelligence Communities and their respective missions.
3. Demonstrate awareness of the roles and powers of various actors and organizations in the policymaking and implementation process within the fields of US and UK national security;
4. Demonstrate a clear understanding of the various political, social, economic, military, legal, and ethical goals and values that form the basis of policymaking decisions.
5. Apply our key authors’ various frameworks for reform and transformation to 21st century realities in order to determine which elements of each framework/approach are realistic in terms of their implementation and most likely to be effective.
6. Demonstrate an understanding of the context, evolution, risks, and linkages of 21st-century realities; the imperative for transformation; national-security issues, alternatives, and solutions; and the ways in which intelligence contributes.
7. Demonstrate a clear understanding of the imperative for transformation in the policy and intelligence arenas, how US and UK policymakers and their ICs might accomplish this, and what relative levels of success or failure imply for the two allies' national security.

Course Bibliography and Required Readings:

**Primary Resources:** This course employs four required textbooks and a number of online journal articles and other materials. The textbooks are as follows:


Course Requirements/ Requirements for Completion/ Grading Policies

In order to take this course, you must:

- Be in the ISSA graduate program at ASU.
- Have continuous broadband Internet access.
- Have the ability/permission to install plug-ins or software (e.g., Adobe Reader or Flash).
- Have the ability to download and save files and documents to a computer.
- Have the ability to open Microsoft files and documents (.doc, .ppt., .xls, etc.).
• Have spoken and written competency in the English language.

**Requirements for Completion**

In order to complete this course, you will need to work through each chapter and all of its assigned materials. A considerable amount of reading and writing is required in each unit. You will learn about the roles and powers of each agency/individual in the U.S. National Security process, review the policymaking process and the U.S. role in multilateral alliances and the United Nations, study specific types of national-security issues and strategies that the government has used to solve these problems, and assess how the policy-intelligence process should change as we move further into the 21st century. You will also need to complete the midterm and final papers.

In order to receive credit for this course, you will need to earn an 80% or higher on your overall final grade. In addition, you must earn at least a 70% on midterm and final papers. This is a graduate course and your performance is judged against that of your classmates. All of you are excellent students. Consequently, you must demonstrate a high level of clear thinking, critical thinking, and the ability to express yourself in writing and speaking. Written expression in the discussion threads and essays is vitally important. Do not submit work without a very careful review of grammar, syntax (sentence structure), spelling, and--most of all--clarity and effectiveness in your argumentation. There is no room for less at the graduate level.

Tips/Suggestions: Issues of national security can be quite complex, and solutions to problems will often involve considerations beyond military defense. History, culture, religion, trade, economics, and relationships with other countries must be taken into consideration in order to implement successful military and homeland security operations. As I emphasize in all of my classes, consider context (history and geography), culture (the collectivity of artifacts and behaviors among a group), rationality (worldview), and change over time are the most crucial factors to consider as you deal with complex issues. Be mindful of these factors as you progress through the course, and reflect on how they have played roles in both successful and unsuccessful national security strategies and military operations.

**Grading Policies**

This course uses three major writing assignments, several short writing assignments, and weekly discussions to measure the student's comprehension of the presented materials. There is an extensive amount of reading assigned that will drive student responses to discussion questions and writing assignments and the student should be prepared to spend upwards of six (6) hours each week on this course. Additionally, where possible, videos are utilized to enhance student learning.

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<tr>
<th>Assignment</th>
<th>Percent of Grade</th>
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<tr>
<td>Participation in Discussion Board</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>Sundays by 11:59 PM CST when no papers are due.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Midterm Essay</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>Sunday at end of Week Five by 11:59 PM CST</td>
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Angelo State University employs a letter grade system. Grades in this course are determined on a percentage scale:

- **A** = 90 – 100 %
- **B** = 80 – 89 %
- **C** = 70 – 79 %
- **D** = 60 – 69 %
- **F** = 59 % and below.

### Guidelines

#### Writings

**Midterm Essay (8-10 pages long),** due on Sunday of Week Five by 11:59 PM CST:

Paul Pillar argues that "The George W. Bush administration's launching of the Iraq War was an especially strong example of a major departure in U.S. foreign policy that was not guided, much less stimulated or instigated, by intelligence. This aspect of decision making on the Iraq War differed from other major departures only in degree and not in kind, however." -- Paul Pillar, *Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010, p. 96). Pillar's statement is a strong one. Do you agree or disagree with it, particularly in its implication that the lack of IC involvement in decisions to take military action has been the norm? Explain and substantiate your argument using course materials as well as other sources. As with all things, the truth is not entirely to either end of the spectrum. However, for this essay, either agree or disagree--do not take a middle position. The intent here is to determine how effectively you can make an argument and advocate for a certain position. Use examples from history to provide context, and do not forget the roles of culture and rationality (ours and theirs) in the policy-making process and intelligence inputs (or lack thereof) to it. Include Omand's key judgments about the policy-intelligence effort during the lead-in to, prosecution of, and aftermath of the Iraq War. What is this British (former) intelligence official's view of the decision for war and the British government's use (or non-use, or misuse) of intelligence to justify the decision for preemptive war? How does it compare or contrast with Pillar's views about the American decision for war?

Formal academic writing uses standardized styles and citation formats. Use the Chicago Style "Notes and Bibliography" format to cite sources. This is available at [http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org](http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org). Papers should have 1-inch margins all around. Use Times New Roman 12-point font. Cite your references in EVERY instance and include a properly formatted bibliography or "Sources Cited" page with each paper. Submit your papers as WORD documents.

**Final Essay (12-15 pages long),** due on Friday of Week 8 by 11:59 PM CST:

This course is entitled "The Transformational Imperative: Reorganizing in a Multipolar World." It focuses on the ways in which policy and intelligence have transformed and reorganized over time--and especially since 9/11--to deal with various threats to our country's and the United Kingdom's security and prosperity. In your view, how effectively have the US and UK Governments and their ICs performed in terms of responding to the many new and serious threats we face in the current century? Omand gives us an approach for employing policy and intelligence instruments more effectively in the highly complex threat environment we face now and will continue to deal with indefinitely. Using source materials from the course and
elsewhere, explain to the reader what YOU think Omand's most important contribution to the debate about policy and intelligence reform is and why. Remember that Omand is British and focuses on the UK intelligence structure, but that his larger arguments are equally applicable to American intelligence efforts. Using Omand's work as your point of departure and as a key reference point for your major arguments, assess the effectiveness of Anglo-American (British and American) policy and intelligence efforts, reforms, and transformation (also referred to in some circles as "paradigm shifts"). How well have the two allies done in terms of recognizing, assessing, and countering the threats we face today and will face tomorrow, and in working together to counter them? From there, discuss how effectively each of the two allies is transforming its intelligence and policy processes to deal with the highly nonlinear, complex, and dangerous 21st century. As you write this essay, bear in mind that policymaking and intelligence are enormously complex efforts, that the integration of the two is even more so, and that domestic politics often impedes the effective development and execution of policy and intelligence efforts in representative democracies. In other words, do not use perfection as your measure of merit. Rather, approach the issue with an understanding that the world is an anarchic, unpredictable, and dangerous place, and that policy and intelligence agencies must do their best within this context.

Formal academic writing uses standardized styles and citation formats. Use the Chicago Style "Notes and Bibliography" format to cite sources. This is available at [http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org](http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org). Papers should have 1-inch margins all around. Use Times New Roman 12-point font. Cite your references in EVERY instance and include a properly formatted bibliography or "Sources Cited" page with each paper. Submit your papers as WORD documents.

Rubrics

Discussion forums and writing assignments will be graded using a standardized rubric. It is recommended that you be familiar with these grading criteria and keep them in mind as you complete the writing assignments. There are two rubrics. Click the link to download the PDF document:

- [Discussion Rubric](#)
- [Writing Assignment Rubric](#)

Course Overview and Reading Assignments

This course demands many things from you:

1. A considerable amount of reading,
2. Relating disparate material by finding relationships and patterns,
3. Research independent of the reading materials, and
4. Writing – good writing, clear writing, demonstrating graduate-level synthesis of material and your own extension of that synthesis to contemporary situations.

Course Organization:

**Lesson 1: The Changing Problem of National Security: Grand Strategy, Policy, and Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century**

This lesson introduces concerns regarding national security in a rapidly changing world. The nonlinear, complex, and increasingly dangerous international environment is placing great stress on policymakers and intelligence agencies as they work together (or sometimes fail to do so) in an effort to keep the state and its people secure and prosperous. The international security situation will not become any less complex or
dangerous. This makes the transformational imperative even more urgent as Cold-War bureaucracies in the Western democracies struggle to transform or at least change enough to remain effective in the national-security arena.

Realpolitik, meaning "real politics" in German, refers to the late-19th century politics followed by German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck to secure Germany's economic and political status. The term describes a philosophy that there is no international law other than power and that countries are therefore best served by putting aside concepts of morality or justice when seeking to secure safety and security. The view largely mirrors the recommendations Hobbes and Machiavelli made centuries earlier. The concept still has many adherents, most notably former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Practitioners of realpolitik are not necessarily opposed to promoting human rights or international law, but see such things as secondary considerations, or even tools, to use only when they benefit primary objectives of strength and security.

This is one competing view of how the international system should operate. It is often called "realism," and is central to geopolitics. In this lesson, the realist argument will be analyzed, along with its implications in a geopolitical world, and the controversy about its continuing relevance to understanding the contemporary national security environment. Many opponents of realism question the validity of the paradigm and its consequences, and their objections are also discussed. Next we consider the future applicability of the realist paradigm in the contemporary environment. The primary competitor, liberalism, views the world as a place where states and other entities must work together in order to defeat serious threats, and within which governments must hold to legal, moral, and ethical standards regardless of the kinds of enemies they face, and the outrages these enemies perpetrate. The US and UK (remember that Omand is British and focuses on the UK approach to the problems of transformation of policy and intelligence organizations and approaches), along with the other Western democracies, employ a complex mix of realism and liberalism in their policy efforts.

What is the most basic purpose of the state? It is almost self-evident that its role is to provide for the physical safety – or security – and prosperity of itself and its people. The state is clearly the designated political element for doing so in the state-centered international system organized around the realist paradigm. To see how this application occurs, this lesson analyzes the impact of change on four basic categories of ongoing importance. First, what is the nature of security? Second, how have the nature and extent of risk been affected? Third, what impact has change had on basic interests? Fourth, what is the changing nature of effective power in the present and the future? Drew and Snow give us the basic terms of reference and insights required to understand how grand strategy, policy, and intelligence interact, and how they should do so as we move further into the 21st century. Omand then focuses us on the question of how best to secure the state in these dangerous and tumultuous times, and the ways in which policymakers and intelligence personnel need to work together in order to do so. Pay particular attention to his heavy focus on the citizenry of the UK (and the US in our case) as the focal point for all policy-intelligence efforts. If any such efforts place the safety and prosperity of the citizenry anywhere less than at the very top, they are, in Omand's view, likely to be both misguided and ineffective. His focus on the PUBLIC value of intelligence; the roles of civic involvement, confidence, and harmony (these topics are featured in later chapters); and the absolute requirement that policy and intelligence be about serving and protecting others rather than those engaged in policy and intelligence processes, is both refreshing and much-needed in the continuing debate on reform and transformation.

Read Drew and Snow, Introduction and Chapters 1-4; Omand, Preface, Introduction, Chapters 1-2 and 5-7.
To repeat a particularly important quote about the dangerous impacts of rationality and epistemological positions, Louis Pasteur said, "The greatest derangement of the mind is to believe in something because one wishes it to be so." We learn more from our failures than from our successes. This century has seen at least four major failures of interpretation of intelligence: the attacks of September 11, 2001, the miscall on Iraqi weapons of mass destructions, and the mass-casualty attacks in Madrid and London. This lesson presents an overview of why we fail. Generally, there are three major reasons why policies fail in relationship to the available intelligence: failure to share information; failure to analyze collected material objectively; and failure of the customer to act on intelligence.

Remember that the most basic purpose of the state is to provide for the physical safety – or security – of itself and its people. The United States Government and its Intelligence Community (IC) failed utterly in this capacity on 9/11 and then in the Iraq War. Pillar's harsh attack on the Bush Administration (and the Clinton Administration before that), and his detailed exposition of the many policy and intelligence failures leading up to the Iraq War, force the reader to consider whether and how policy and intelligence efforts might improve now and in the coming years. Even with the PATRIOT Act and the IRTPA, which were downward-directed reforms, we see indications that large-scale and "revolutionary" changes cannot have the same level of effectiveness over the long haul as careful, incremental, and targeted changes to the policy-intelligence relationship and process. Pillar has an ax to grind, and this is clear in his work, but his arguments are generally either compelling or at least thought-provoking and thus worthy of careful study.

As your read the first half of Pillar's work, relate it to the first week's readings on the grand-strategy, policy, and intelligence processes, and on how the new century is making it more difficult than ever to secure the state from attacks or (paradoxically) from self-inflicted policy efforts such as those leading to and during the Iraq War. How must the Western democracies and particularly the US transform its policy and intelligence organizations, approaches, and efforts to minimize the risks of grand-strategic failure and maximize the chances of success? Omand's chapter, which focuses on other policy-intelligence failures, will give you additional context and depth as you grapple with Pillar's assertions and our way ahead in the policy-intelligence transformation effort. Pillar's book, which we continue to read this week, covers topics from policymaker scapegoating of intelligence, the 9/11 Commission and subsequent reforms, and Pillar's assertion that the reforms cannot work. Is Pillar on target here? Does the ax he's grinding blind him to key issues--and perhaps even post-9/11 successes--in the policy-intelligence arena? Omand builds on Pillar's arguments with his own regarding the importance of resilience and civic harmony in any kind of effective policy-intelligence approach to securing the state in the 21st century. He focuses directly on the citizenry and the absolute requirement that all policy and intelligence efforts be focused first and foremost on their safety and prosperity. Where and how do Pillar and Omand overlap in their arguments? Where do they differ? How do the very different articles on the IC's anticipation of and reporting on the rise of ISIS drive home the often deep and perhaps unbridgeable divides between policy and intelligence players?

The extent to which a country and its people embrace a realist or some alternative orientation toward the world is influenced by its contextual (historical, geographic, demographic) experience and other conditioning factors that influence how it sees the world. For most of American history, that experience has been primarily positive with low levels of threat that make the current higher-threat environment all the more distinct.
Even in the case of the UK, which has dealt with numerous very high-threat situations during the past 300 years (and beyond), new and emerging adversaries and the threats they pose are forcing adaptation and transformation in the policy-intelligence arena. This is one of the reasons Omand looks specifically at the PUBLIC value of resilience and civic harmony as part of a larger transformation effort within the UK (and, one might argue, the US).

The brief case studies presented in this lesson highlight how the Americans and their British allies are attempting to deal with the complexities, nonlinearities, and imponderables of adversaries and threats in the new century.

Read Pillar, Chapters 7-11; Omand, Chapters 3-4, and the two very different views of the role of intelligence in anticipating and reporting the rise of ISIS at Link 1 and Link 2

Lesson 4: **Working Toward Transformation: The Challenge of the New**

Pillar and Omand conclude their books with several assertions regarding the requirement for transformation in the policy-intelligence arena. While Pillar rejects the 9/11 Commission findings and subsequent intelligence reforms nearly categorically, Omand is somewhat less critical of reform efforts to date. Rather, Omand seeks to address the question of transformation as broadly and creatively as possible. In particular, Omand focuses first and foremost on the people who matter most—the citizens of the UK in his case, and the citizens of the US in ours—and reminds us constantly and forcefully that policy-intelligence reform and transformation are all about keeping these people safe and prosperous. Both authors make a number of compelling arguments along with some that you may find less than impressive. Where do you see potential in their approaches to reform and transformation, and where do you see either misjudgments or ideas that are simply too difficult to bring to fruition given the nature of human bureaucracies and interactions?

Rolington picks up, in effect, where Pillar and Omand leave off, describing for us an incredibly complex and dangerous 21st-century world in which what he refers to as "strategic intelligence" (intelligence focused on making direct and positive contributions to the formulation of grand strategy and its implementation through policy decisions) approaches transformation in a distinctive way. His employment of a narrative combining events since the end of the Cold War, brief historical anecdotes from periods long preceding the current day, and the major impacts of technological advances on national and international security build on Drew's and Snow's discussion of grand strategy and policy as well as Pillar's and Omand's views on the need for and best approaches to reform and transformation. Rolington's opening chapters set the stage for the remainder of the course, during which we will examine more deeply how the range of 21st-century adversaries and threats requires the US and UK policy-intelligence structures to engage in real, effective, and rapid if iterative transformation.

Read Pillar, Chapters 12-13; Omand, Chapters 11-12; Rolington, Introduction and Chapters 1-3

Lesson 5: **The Domestic Environment: Resilience, Civic Harmony, Ethics, and Adaptation**

Omand's excellent discussion of the domestic environment and its central place in any transformation effort is at the center of this week's lesson. Without public support and trust, reform and transformation will not work, particularly in a Western democracy that lives by the rule of law and individual freedoms and protections. The House of Commons initial report on the 7 July 2005 London train bombings accompanies the Omand reading this week to give you additional food for thought regarding questions of failure, surprise, resilience, civic harmony, and legal/ethical quandaries, among other topics. At the same time, governments and the people themselves must develop resilient and survivable
organizations, structures, networks, and other critical aspects of any 21st-century state in order to be able to withstand, recover from, and respond to any major attacks on the homeland or citizens overseas. One of the greatest challenges facing policymakers and intelligence professionals is the public's "Hollywood" (and associated media) view of intelligence--what the government can and cannot do, how and to what degree it is violating individual and collective rights, and so forth. The Anglo-American governments, and particularly their ICs, have a major internal issue and effort on their hands in order to help the American and British people understand what they really do, and also to walk the difficult path between collecting too much information and thus violating constitutional rights, and collecting too little and thus placing Americans and British at much greater risk for another series of mass-casualty attacks. Finally, the ethical and legal components of reform and transformation come into play with a vengeance as Americans quite appropriately question whether and to what degree their government is violating the 4th Amendment and other basic rights in its effort to protect the homeland. Benjamin Franklin said that "Any people that gives up its freedoms for temporary security will soon find that it has neither." So, old problems are made new as we continue our study of policy-intelligence transformation. Omand is clearly quite concerned about these issues as well from the British point of view.

Read Omand, Chapters 3-4 and 9-10, the initial House of Commons report on the 7 July London train bombings, and lessons-learned from the bombings.

Lesson 6: Moving Further Into the Future: One Approach To the Challenge

The remainder of Rolington's book brings us face-to-face with a variety of 21st-century policy-intelligence dilemmas, threats, and opportunities. Rolington covers the waterfront in terms of emerging threats and opportunities from the Deep Web and Dark Web, to cyber threats, to business intelligence and law-enforcement intelligence, to the contextual and cultural factors that drive our enemies to attack us and also give us insights into how best to defeat them. Rolington concludes his work (and in fact begins it, as we've already seen) with his view of the policy-intelligence transformation that must occur. This "Mosaic Method," as he calls it, is designed to flatten hierarchies, provide much greater interconnectivity across all aspects of the intelligence effort (policy, military, business, and law-enforcement)--"hyperconnectivity" to use on term now in vogue, speed the flow of information to the people who need it, and put the information to immediate use within the context of effective plans and operations that relate directly to grand-strategy and policy objectives.

Rolington sees 9/11 as a key fault line that brought the problem of a globalized and highly complex and nonlinear threat to our doorstep, but for him this is just one of many serious challenges. Terrorism is at the forefront of international concerns affecting Anglo-American and other states' national security, and it remains the most obvious and powerful national security legacy of the 2000s. However, Rolington sees cyber threats, climate change, international criminal organizations, and other dangerous problems emerging and implores us to think about and act on those now as we work to reform and transform the IC and other intelligence organizations. What do you think of his approach, argumentation, and "Mosaic Method"? Are they realistic given bureaucratic imperatives and resistance to change? Might they be worthwhile elements of a paradigm shift that appears to be underway despite institutional resistance? How might you incorporates Rolington's thinking and suggestions into your own efforts?

The Clapper-Stewart testimony to Congress brings many of Rolington's concerns, ideas, and proposed reforms into sharp focus. Consider how Rolington, Pillar, and Omand might approach these various concerns, individually and in the aggregate, and how--and to what degree--their approaches might overlap.

Read Rolington, Chapters 4-12 and watch the Clapper-Stewart testimony regarding global
we return to Drew and Snow this week for insights into the military aspects of policy-intelligence transformation and range of major dilemmas confronting a shrinking and overworked military, with aging weapon systems, that must deal with an unprecedentedly complex and broad collection of threats to our national security. Drew and Snow walk us through the entire spectrum of military threats, from asymmetric warfare (among the oldest forms of armed conflict, NOT the newest!), to the continuing existential importance of nuclear weapons and other WMD-related issues, to the enduring imperative for being able to wage and win major conventional wars. The requirement to prepare for all eventualities poses the risk that we will in fact be prepared for none of them to anything approaching an adequate degree, and that the on-the-job training our troops must endure in combat "the "learning curve") will be costly. This problem impacts the IC with special force, and most of all the DoD components of our intelligence capabilities. Collectors and analysts must move from one problem to another with unprecedented speed, which denies them the time they need to develop adequate depth of knowledge on a given adversary or threat. Iraq and Afghanistan have been painful reminders of all of these challenges, but they will not by any means be the greatest or the last. The short articles on ISIS, the war in Yemen, and the major Taliban offensive in Helmand Province remind us that even if these events appear to be independent of one another, they have a reciprocal relationship with Takfiri jihadi extremism and thus pose a collective and major threat to stability in various parts of the world and by extension US national security.

The dominant theme of American and British national security policy during the first decade of the twenty-first century has been Takfiri extremism and the terrorist groups and actions it spawns, and this theme has been most evident in American military action in the Middle-East aimed at controlling or eliminating the terrorist threat. Both Iraq and Afghanistan have have displayed characteristics of asymmetrical wars. Moreover, the short- to mid-term likelihood is that the United States will continue to find interests in these kinds of conflicts and appropriate responses to them. Most recently, the indirect support to the Government of Yemen and the continuing low-level effort against ISIS are examples of US engagement with asymmetric threats as the American public tires of committing major ground forces with the attendant costs in blood and treasure. However, there are many other challenges that call for strong military and intelligence capabilities. Chinese actions in the South China Sea, with its critically important sea lines of communication ($14 trillion a year in goods and nearly 75% of oil produced in the Middle East transit these SLOCs), and Russia's campaign of controlled instability and irredentism in Ukraine are just two of these many other major problems the military and IC must confront.

Thinking about and planning for large-scale war between armed forces as they were developed for and fought in World War II - conventional forces for symmetrical warfare and strategic nuclear war - predate and postdate September 11, 2001. The traditional purposes for which these forces were developed seemed largely to disappear with the end of the Cold War, and only the United States, China, and Russia retain robust, traditional military capabilities that they continue to maintain through force modernization. Critics say these large, conventional and nuclear forces are anachronisms in a "new world" of shadowy asymmetrical threats. Russian aggression against its neighbors, and increasingly brazen Chinese military deployments and patrols in the South China Sea act as counters to this argument. Before assessing the merits of these criticisms, however, it is necessary to describe traditional forces and missions, first nuclear forces and then conventional forces and the residual problems associated with each that have a continuing impact on the world stage - notably weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the problems their spread to other states and non-state entities (proliferation) creates.

**Lesson 7: The Military Dimension of Transformation: Dealing with Asymmetrical Warfare and Its Unresolved Dilemmas**
The lesson concludes with some assessment of the relevance of these forces in the future.

As you complete this week's readings, think carefully about how the military aspects of national security relate to the larger policy-intelligence effort, which should itself support a clear grand strategy and an equally clear set of policy actions to help achieve the national objectives inherent within the strategy. How does the imperative for reform and longer-term transformation relate to the issues of military preparedness and armed conflict?

Read Drew and Snow, Chapters 6, 8-10, 12-14; the short report on military ineffectiveness against ISIS; the article on the war in Yemen; the short article on the major Taliban offensive in Helmand Province; the article on the South China Sea; and a useful piece on the failure of the realist paradigm (and most intelligence analyses) to get at the essence of the causes and course of the war in eastern Ukraine.

Lesson 8: Taking Stock: Policy, Intelligence, and Transformation In the New Century

This lesson reviews the major concepts, issues, threats, and opportunities our 21st-century world presents us, and how we might move with maximum effectiveness to deal with these challenges. It is, in large part, a means for reviewing and bringing together the key ideas and concepts you've learned about in the course so you can work those, as required, into your final essays. The readings for this week simply comprise a review of the closing chapters, and thus the conclusions and recommendations, that the major authors in this course advocate. As you craft your final paper, it is absolutely crucial that you understand clearly what each author is arguing, how it relates to what the other authors are arguing, how their assertions agree or disagree, and what your assessment of their work tells you about which solutions are the most realistic and potentially effective. There are many good ideas in the course readings and some that might not be so good—you must engage in some analysis to determine which are which, and why you consider that to be the case. Keep the "big four" analytical factors (context, culture, rationality/worldview, and change over time) very much in mind as you review the authors' closing arguments. Each author has a unique background, unique professional experiences, and unique insights and (inevitably) biases. Engage in "critical reading" (the functional equivalent of critical thinking) to discern these, and to account for them as you write your final paper.

Review the following readings from your texts:

- Snow Chapter 13, "Terrorism, Peacekeeping, and State Building"
- Snow Chapter 14, "Extending Security under Obama"
- Pillar Chapter 12, "Real Reform"
- Pillar Chapter 13, "Adapting Policy to Uncertainty"
- Omand, Chapter 11, "Intelligence Design"
- Omand, Chapter 12, "A Fresco for the Future"
- Rolington, Chapter 12, "Strategic Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century"

Communication

Office Hours/Contacting the Instructor

See the Instructor Information section for contact information.

University Policies
Academic Integrity
Angelo State University expects its students to maintain complete honesty and integrity in their academic pursuits. Students are responsible for understanding and complying with the university Academic Honor Code and the ASU Student Handbook.

Accommodations for Disability
ASU is committed to the principle that no qualified individual with a disability shall, on the basis of disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs or activities of the university, or be subjected to discrimination by the university, as provided by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments of 2008 (ADAAA), and subsequent legislation.

Student Affairs is the designated campus department charged with the responsibility of reviewing and authorizing requests for reasonable accommodations based on a disability, and it is the student's responsibility to initiate such a request by emailing studentservices@angelo.edu, or by contacting:

Office of Student Affairs
University Center, Suite 112
325-942-2047 Office
325-942-2211 FAX

Student absence for religious holidays
A student who intends to observe a religious holy day should make that intention known in writing to the instructor prior to the absence. A student who is absent from classes for the observance of a religious holy day shall be allowed to take an examination or complete an assignment scheduled for that day within a reasonable time after the absence.