

Course Syllabus and Policy Requirement Statement

In order to access your course materials, you must agree to the following, by clicking the "Mark Reviewed" button below.

By checking the "Mark Reviewed" link below, you are indicating the following:

- You have read, understood, and will comply with the policies and procedures listed in the class syllabus, and that you have acquired the required textbook(s).
- You have read, understood, and will comply with class policies and procedures as specified in the online [Student Handbook](#).
- You have read, understood, and will comply with computer and software requirements as specified with [Browser Test](#).
- You have familiarize yourself with how to access course content in Blackboard using the [Student Quick Reference Guide](#) or [CSS Student Orientation Course](#).

ISSA 4103 Case Studies in Intelligence

Course Description/Overview

This is the course in the Bachelor of Intelligence, Security Studies, and Analysis degree program designed for CCAF graduates. It is built around eight historical intelligence case studies stretching from the American Civil War to the 12-year war in Afghanistan. In each of these case studies, you will learn about the role intelligence played contextually within each side's policymaking, planning, and operational efforts—and whether the intelligence effort helped or hindered the effort in question.

In each case study, you will determine how intelligence worked or failed to work, why this was the case, and how the performance of intelligence organizations influenced the course of the conflict. This will require you to have a strong grasp of context, culture, rationality, and change over time as it applied to each of the conflicts under study, and to relate the level of intelligence effectiveness to these factors and how well or poorly each side took account of them and incorporated key understandings into the intelligence and operations efforts. The case studies are complex. We study the past to understand the present and succeed in the future. This is nowhere truer than in the intelligence profession.

Click this link for a [printable version of the syllabus](#).

Course Objectives/Learning Outcomes

Objectives: As a result of completing this course, the student will be able to:

1. Comprehend the varying roles and effectiveness of intelligence in policymaking, security, and armed conflict—collectively and within the context of each of the course's eight case studies.
2. Understand how intelligence organizations interact with their policy and military counterparts during crises.
3. Comprehend how and why a deep understanding of one's adversary confers various benefits during armed conflicts as well as crises short of war.
4. Given a specific case study, understand how intelligence influenced the course of events and whether the influence aided or hindered policy efforts.
5. In cases where a given side failed to achieve its objectives, comprehend the degree to which policy, intelligence, and operational failures contributed to defeat.
6. In cases where a given side achieved its objectives, understand the degree to which policy, intelligence, and operations successes contributed to the victory.

Course Prerequisites:

The student should have a basic understanding of the intelligence community, intelligence cycle, and standard analytic methodologies including structured analytic techniques.

Course Required and Recommended Texts:

Required

Handel, Michael, ed. *Intelligence and Military Operations*. (Oxon, UK: Frank Cass and Co., 1990). Paperback or Kindle. ISBN 0-7146-4060-3.

Lt Col Walter T. Hitchcock, ed., [The Intelligence Revolution: A Historical Perspective](#) (Washington D.C.: USAF Academy and Office of Air Force History, 1991).

Galula, David. [Pacification in Algeria 1956-1958](#). (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2006).

Recommended

1. Drea, Edward J. MacArthur's Ultra: Codebreaking and the War against Japan, 1942-1945. (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992). Paperback. ISBN 0-7006-0576-2.

2. Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, second edition. (New York: Longman, 1999). Paperback or Kindle. ISBN 0-321-01349-2.

3. Allen, George W. None So Blind: A Personal Account of the Intelligence Failure in Vietnam. (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001). Hardback. ISBN ISBN 1-56663-387-7.

Recommended Websites

These websites provide access to a broader selection of literature the student may want to reference for this course.

- <http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/bibs/strategy2011.htm#tag>
- <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-thry.htm>
- The Economist: <http://www.economist.com/>
- The New York Times: <http://www.nytimes.com/>
- The Christian Science Monitor: <http://www.csmonitor.com/>
- The Council on Foreign Relations: <http://www.cfr.org/>
- GlobalSecurity.org: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/>
- Foreign Policy: <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/>
- Foreign Affairs: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/>
- Foreign Policy Research Institute: <http://www.fpri.org/about/>

Course Expectations

MODE OF INSTRUCTION, STUDENT PREPARATION and PARTICIPATION:

ISSA 4303 is a colloquium (meaning a group discussion, from the Latin Colloqui – to talk together, to have a conversation). As such, weekly participation in the discussion threads is expected and forms part of the grade. Final grades are composed as follows:

Grading Policy

Assignment	Percent of Grade	Due
Participation in the Discussion Board	20%	Week 1 - 7.
Mid-term paper	40%	Week 1 - 7 Due Sunday night at 11:59 PM CST week 4 (4 pages)
Final Essay	40%	Friday of Week 8 at 11:59 PM CST. (8 - 10 pages)

Angelo State University employs a letter grade system. Grades in this course are determined on a percentage scale:

- A = 90 – 100 %
- B = 80 – 89 %
- C = 70 – 79 %
- D = 60 – 69 %
- F = 59 % and below.

Mid-term Assessment-Essay (Due Sunday at 11:59 PM CST week 4)

This 4-page paper requires you to provide a brief background and assessment of the week's case study, including what you consider to be the most important insights you gleaned from studying intelligence and policy efforts relating to the conflict. Minimum of four sources with corresponding citations. Any format you are familiar with (Chicago Style, APA, MLA, etc.).

Final Essay (Due Friday of Week 8 at 11:59 PM CST)

Complete and submit an 8-10 page assessment-essay regarding the effectiveness of intelligence and policy in the Afghanistan and Iran crises. Use this week's

readings, readings from past case studies, and any outside readings to assess the likelihood of "success" or "failure" based on US policy objectives. Provide (1) a brief background regarding both crises, (2) an assessment of the effectiveness of current policies, (3) an analysis of likely policy "success" or "failure," and (4) recommended courses of action in the wake of either successful or unsuccessful policy efforts. Minimum of four

sources with corresponding citations. Any format you are familiar with (Chicago Style, APA, MLA, etc.).

Note: You are responsible for finding source materials over and above those provided in this syllabus and the Chapter 8 tab. Research is analogous to the collection process in the intelligence profession. From there, analysis of the sources you locate will help you to employ critical thinking and make assessments much like intelligence analysts do in their jobs. Use direct quotes sparingly and only for the most important points you wish to make.

Assignment Submission

You are required to submit your writing assignments by the scheduled dates and times. Late papers will not be accepted. No exceptions will be made.

Readings and Assignments

Please note that it may be necessary at times to deviate from the schedule below. This will be announced via the course announcements page and email. It is your responsibility to be cognizant of these changes and act upon them accordingly.

Course Organization:

Lesson 1: Intelligence Before the 20th Century—The American Civil War

Lesson Objectives

1. Introduce the course and cover course requirements, syllabus and policies.
2. Understand the contextual factors surrounding intelligence in the Civil War.
3. Comprehend Union and Confederate intelligence efforts.
4. Understand how these intelligence efforts influenced the course of operations.
5. Comprehend how intelligence and strategy interacted during the Civil War.
6. Understand the uses and limits of intelligence in the context of the Civil War.

Readings

1. Dennis E. Showalter, "[Intelligence of the Eve of Transformation](#)," in *The Intelligence Revolution: A Historical Perspective*, Lt Col Walter T. Hitchcock, LT Col, USAF, editor (Washington D.C.: U.S. Air Force Academy and Office of Air Force History, 1991), pp. 15-32.
2. John Cook, [American Civil War Round Table or Australia](#) (New South Wales Chapter), "Military Intelligence during America's Civil War."
3. Thomas Allen, CIA Library, "[Intelligence in the Civil War](#)".
4. Peter Maslowski, "[Military Intelligence Sources during the American Civil War: A Case Study](#)"; in *The Intelligence Revolution: A Historical Perspective*, Lt Col Walter T. Hitchcock, LT Col, USAF, editor (Washington D.C.: U.S. Air Force Academy and Office of Air Force History, 1991), pp. 39-60.
5. Jay Luvaas, "[The Role of Intelligence in the Chancellorsville Campaign, April-May, 1863](#)," in Michael Handel, editor, *Intelligence and Military Operations* (Oxon, UK: Frank Cass and Co., 1990), pp. 99-114.
6. Jay Luvaas, "[Lee at Gettysburg: A General Without Intelligence](#)," in Michael Handel, editor, *Intelligence and Military Operations* (Oxon, UK: Frank Cass and Co., 1990), pp. 116-134.

Assignments

- Appropriately respond to the discussion thread topic.

Lesson 2: Intelligence in a New Century—World War I

Lesson Objectives

1. Understand the contextual factors surrounding intelligence in World War I.
2. Comprehend why German SIGINT was so important to the victories at Tannenberg and Masurian Lakes on the Eastern Front in 1914, and how they set the stage for further German and Austro-Hungarian successes.
3. Comprehend Commonwealth (British) and Ottoman efforts in Mesopotamia and Palestine from 1914 to 1918.
4. Understand how intelligence influenced the course of operations at various points in these campaigns in the Middle East.
5. Understand how Commonwealth deception relied on intelligence and irregular-warfare efforts, and how it contributed to British victory in 1918.
6. Comprehend how intelligence and strategy interacted during World War I.
7. Understand the uses and limits of intelligence in the context of World War I.

Readings

1. "The First World War, 1914-1918" (Overview for Situational Awareness) at http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/wars_wwI.html
2. "The Eastern Front in 1914" (Map for Situational Awareness) at <http://www.robinsonlibrary.com/history/history/worldwarI/eastfront.htm>
3. Bard College, "the Ultimate Way of Seeing: Aerial Reconnaissance in World War I" at <http://dronecenter.bard.edu/wwi-photography/>
4. Richard Popplewell, "British Intelligence in Mesopotamia 1914-1916," in Michael Handel, editor, *Intelligence and Military Operations* (Oxon, UK: Frank Cass and Co., 1990), pp. 139-166.
5. T. E. Lawrence, "The Evolution of a Revolt" at <http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/lawrence.pdf>
6. Yigal Sheffy, "Institutionalized Deception and Perception Reinforcement: Allenby's Campaigns in Palestine," in Michael Handel, editor, *Intelligence and Military Operations* (Oxon, UK: Frank Cass and Co., 1990), pp. 173-230.

Assignments

- Appropriately respond to the discussion thread topic.

Lesson 3: Intelligence Comes of Age—World War II and Its Interwar Antecedents

Lesson Objectives

1. Understand the contextual factors surrounding intelligence leading up to and during World War II.
2. Comprehend why intelligence grew in importance to the war effort compared to the American Civil War and First World War.
3. Comprehend the differences—and different levels of effectiveness—of Allied and Axis intelligence in the European Theater.
4. Comprehend the differences—and different levels of effectiveness—of Allied and Axis intelligence in the Pacific Theater.
5. Understand the influence of intelligence on Allied and Axis fortunes at the grand-strategic (policy), military-strategic (overall military conduct), operational (campaign-level), or tactical (battles) levels of war.
6. Comprehend how intelligence and strategy interacted during World War II.
7. Understand the uses and limits of intelligence in the context of World War II.

Readings

1. Alvin D. Coox, "Flawed Perception And Its Effect Upon Operational Thinking: The Case of the Japanese Army, 1937-41," in Michael Handel, editor, *Intelligence and Military Operations* (Oxon, UK: Frank Cass and Co., 1990), pp. 239-253.
2. Hisashi Takahashi, "[A Case Study: Japanese Intelligence Estimates of China and the Chinese, 1931-1945](#)," in *The Intelligence Revolution: A Historical Perspective*, Lt Col

- Walter T. Hitchcock, LT Col, USAF, editor (Washington D.C.: U.S. Air Force Academy and Office of Air Force History, 1991), pp. 203-220.
3. Edward J. Drea, "Ultra Intelligence and General Douglas MacArthur's Leap to Hollandia, January-April 1944," in Michael Handel, editor, *Intelligence and Military Operations* (Oxon, UK: Frank Cass and Co., 1990), pp. 323-343.
 4. Sebastian Cox, "A Comparative Analysis of RAF and Luftwaffe Intelligence in the Battle of Britain, 1940," in Michael Handel, editor, *Intelligence and Military Operations* (Oxon, UK: Frank Cass and Co., 1990), pp. 425-442.
 5. Jürgen Rohwer, "[Allied and Axis Radio-Intelligence in the Battle of the Atlantic: A Comparative Analysis](#)," in *The Intelligence Revolution: A Historical Perspective*, Lt Col Walter T. Hitchcock, LT Col, USAF, editor (Washington D.C.: U.S. Air Force Academy and Office of Air Force History, 1991), pp. 77-100.
 6. Patrick Beesley, "Convoy PQ 17: A Study of Intelligence and Decision-Making," in Michael Handel, editor, *Intelligence and Military Operations* (Oxon, UK: Frank Cass and Co., 1990), pp. 292-320.
 7. John Ferris, "The British Army, Signals and Security in the Desert Campaign, 1940-42," in Michael Handel, editor, *Intelligence and Military Operations* (Oxon, UK: Frank Cass and Co., 1990), pp. 255-287.
 8. Christopher Andrew, "[Intelligence Collaboration between Britain and the United States during the Second World War](#)," in *The Intelligence Revolution: A Historical Perspective*, Lt Col Walter T. Hitchcock, LT Col, USAF, editor (Washington D.C.: U.S. Air Force Academy and Office of Air Force History, 1991), pp. 111-119.
 9. Robert S. Ehlers, Jr., Ph.D., "[Air Intelligence and the Bombing of Nazi Germany](#)," unpublished article, 19 December 2013.

Assignments

- Appropriately respond to the discussion thread topic.

Lesson 4: Cold War Dilemmas I—The Cuban Missile Crisis

Lesson Objectives

1. Understand the contextual factors surrounding the role of intelligence during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
2. Comprehend where and why intelligence either succeeded or failed as an aid to policymakers as they sought to resolve the crisis.
3. Comprehend the reasons why President Kennedy ultimately relied more heavily on ExCom inputs than on intelligence but also where and how he found intelligence to be particularly useful.
4. Comprehend how intelligence influenced the larger response to the crisis, its resolution, and succeeding Cold-War developments.
5. Understand why labeling a complex intelligence effort like the one for the Cuban Missile Crisis a "success" or a "failure" is too vague.

Readings

1. Video, CIA, "[Cuban Missile Crisis 1962—Symposium on Intelligence.](#)"
2. Kenneth Michael Absher, "[Mind-Sets and Missiles: A First Hand Account of the Cuban Missile Crisis.](#)"
3. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/declass.htm

Assignments

- Mid-term Assessment-Essay
- Appropriately respond to the discussion thread topic.

Lesson 5: Cold War Dilemmas II—The Vietnam War

Lesson Objectives

1. Understand the contextual factors surrounding the role of intelligence during the American period of the Vietnam War.
2. Comprehend the degree to which American intelligence professionals and policymakers learned from the preceding French experience in Vietnam.
3. Comprehend the factors that contributed to the "Tet Effect" and how those factors apply to other intelligence failures.
4. Comprehend why civilian and military leaders persisted in giving the American public overly optimistic intelligence assessments about Vietnam.
5. Understand the substance and continuing validity of intelligence "lessons-learned" from the failures in Vietnam.

Readings

1. United States Military Academy, 1968, "[Revolutionary Warfare, Volume 5—French Counterrevolutionary Struggles: Indochina and Algeria,](#)" pp. 1-96.
2. Jean-Marc LePage, PhD, and Elie Tenenbaum, "[French and American Intelligence Relations During the First Indochina War, 1950–54,](#)" Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2011).

Assignments

- Appropriately respond to the discussion thread topic.

Lesson 6: Context and Culture—The French Experience in Algeria

Lesson Objectives

1. Understand the contextual and cultural factors surrounding the role of intelligence during the Algerian War.

2. Comprehend the degree to which French intelligence personnel, senior commanders, troops, and policymakers learned from the preceding French experience in Vietnam.
3. Comprehend how and why the French intelligence and counterinsurgency efforts succeeded in Algeria.
4. Comprehend how and why pacification efforts in the field played such a major role in the French military-strategic victory,
5. Understand why French policymakers decided to leave Algeria after their military had won a resounding victory. Compare and contrast this briefly with American policymakers' decisions to leave Vietnam and Iraq after military victories there.

Readings

1. David Galula, [*Pacification in Algeria 1956-1958*](#) (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2006), pp. 61-188.

Assignments

- Appropriately respond to the discussion thread topic.

Lesson 7: Cognition, Rationality, and Surprise—The Yom Kippur/October War

Lesson Objectives

1. Understand the contextual and cultural factors surrounding the role of intelligence during the Yom Kippur/October War.
2. Comprehend why Israeli policymakers and civilian leaders failed to prepare for the Egyptian-Syrian attack despite ample warning.
3. Understand how and why Egyptian/Syrian intelligence and deception worked.
4. Comprehend how effectively the intelligence process worked for the Israelis.
5. Comprehend how and why the war threatened to become a flashpoint for direct Superpower conflict, and how policymakers averted this outcome.
6. Understand how the war changed the grand-strategic balance in the Middle East for the next 40 years—and perhaps more.

Readings

1. <http://www.history.com/topics/yom-kippur-war>
2. <http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/modern-world-history-1918-to-1980/the-middle-east-1917-to-1973/the-yom-kippur-war-of-1973/>
3. http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/73_War.html

Assignments

- Appropriately respond to the discussion thread topic.

Lesson 8: Continuing Dilemmas—Afghanistan and Iran

Lesson Objectives

1. Understand the contextual and cultural factors surrounding the role of intelligence and policymaking in Afghanistan and with the Iran nuclear issue.
2. Comprehend why American policies regarding the two countries developed how they did, and what their effects and effectiveness have been.
3. Understand how and why the Taliban and Iranian government continue to succeed in preventing the US from achieving policy objectives.
4. Comprehend how the Taliban and Iranian government have been able to leverage US policy decisions, or lack thereof, in their favor.
5. Comprehend the key policy issues and threats posed by a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan and a nuclear Iran.

Readings

1. Congressional Research Service, Kenneth Katzman, "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy" at <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf>
2. Majid Rafizadeh, "Iran 2015, Strategic, Geopolitical and Economic Priorities," at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/majid-rafizadeh/iran-2015-strategic-geopo_b_6415014.html
3. Kenneth N. Waltz, "[Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability](#)," *Foreign Policy* July-August 2012.
4. Graeme Smith et al., "[Prospects for Afghanistan 2014](#)," *Foreign Policy* December 2013.

Assignments

- Final Essay

Communication

Office Hours/Contacting the Instructor

Tues-Fri 1:30-4:00 pm CST, other times by appointment.

University Policies

Academic Integrity

Angelo State University expects its students to maintain complete honesty and integrity in their academic pursuits. Students are responsible for understanding and complying with the university [Academic Honor Code](#) and the [ASU Student Handbook](#).

Accommodations for Disability

The Student Life Office is the designated campus department charged with the responsibility of reviewing and authorizing requests for reasonable accommodations based on a disability, and it is the student's responsibility to initiate such a request by contacting the Student Life Office at (325) 942-2191 or (325) 942-2126 (TDD/FAX) or by e-mail at Student.Life@angelo.edu to begin the process. The Student Life Office will establish the particular documentation requirements necessary for the various types of disabilities.

Student absence for religious holidays

A student who intends to observe a religious holy day should make that intention known in writing to the instructor prior to the absence. A student who is absent from classes for the observance of a religious holy day shall be allowed to take an examination or complete an assignment scheduled for that day within a reasonable time after the absence.